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By RODNEY A. GRUNES AND JON VEEN*
BY EVERY STANDARD of measure, Justice Byron White was certainly
correct when he observed that Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. "will
surely be remembered as among the greatest Justices who have ever
sat on the Supreme Court."' An exceptionally prodigious and bright
scholar, Brennan participated in more than one-quarter of the cases
decided by the United States Supreme Court in the twentieth century.
He wrote more eloquent and significant opinions than any other jus-
tice. 2 For almost thirty-four years, he was the High Court's most articu-
late champion of freedom of expression,3 the rights of criminal
defendants, 4 and expanding equality for racial minorities, 5 women, 6
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1. Byron W. White, Tribute to the Honorable Williamj Brennan, Jr., 100 YALE L.J. 1113,
1113 (1991).
2. See generally Rodney A. Grunes, Justice William j Brennan, Jr., in GREAT JUSTICES OF
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 279 (William 0. Pederson & Norman J. Provizer eds., 1993)
(noting thatJustice Brennan "had an enormous impact on constitutional jurisprudence").
Indeed, some scholars have considered Justice Brennan "the most influential member of
the [Supreme] Court in this century." Nat Hentoff, Profiles: The Constitutionalist, NEW
YORKER, Mar. 12, 1990, at 45.
3. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (noting that
"debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open").
4. See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 4 (1964) (refusing to reverse prior decisions
holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is applicable against
the states).
5. See, e.g., Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968) ("The constitutional
rights of Negro school children articulated in Brown [v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954),] permit no less than" the elimination of racial discrimination "root and branch.").
6. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("[C]lassifications by gender
must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achieve-
ment of those objectives.").
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and the poor.7 A devout Catholic who attended mass every week,8 in
the eyes of many scholars, Justice Brennan "became the high tribu-
nal's leading anti-establishmentarian." 9 In this role, Justice Brennan
"represented his creed that under our Constitution the state must res-
olutely stay out of the church and the church must resolutely stay out
of the state."' 0
The Senate Judiciary Committee considered Justice Brennan's
Catholicism important during his confirmation process. 1l Responding
to questions regarding the impact of his Catholicism on his jurispru-
dence, Brennan reassured the Senate Judiciary Committee that his re-
sponsibility as a justice was to interpret the Constitution, without
regard to his own personal religious feelings. When asked a direct
question about his Catholicism, Brennan replied:
[M]y answer to the question is categorically that in everything I
have ever done, in every office I have held in my life or that I shall
ever do in the future, what shall control me is the oath that I took
to support the Constitution and laws of the United States and so
act upon the cases that come before me for decision that it is that
oath and that alone which governs. 12
Brennan steadfastly held to this view during his tenure on the Court.
As he explained to former law clerk Jeffrey T. Leeds, "[a] s a Roman
Catholic I might do as a private citizen what a Roman Catholic does,
and that is one thing, but to the extent that conflicts with what I think
the Constitution means or requires, then my religious beliefs have to
give way." 13
7. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970) (holding that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required a hearing before terminating an
individual's welfare benefits).
8. See KIM ISAAC EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR ALL: WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., AND THE DECI-
SIONS THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 68 (1993). Indeed, many have considered Justice Bren-
nan "the most devout member of the Court." HENRYJ. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS
268 (3d ed. 1992).
9. ABRAHAM, supra note 8, at 268.
10. Id. at 264-65. This view is consistent with James Madison's view of a perfect separa-
tion of church and state. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW RESOURCE CENTER, LAW, RELIGION & THE
"SEcuLAR" STATE 12 (1991). Under Madison's view, both "government and religion could
best achieve their respective purposes if each was left free from the interference within its
own sphere of interest." Id.
11. See Nomination of WilliamJoseph Brennan, Jr., of New Jersey, To Be AssociateJustice of the
Supreme Court: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciay, 85th Cong. 32-34 (1957)
[hereinafter Brennan Hearings). Many of these questions arose because Brennan declared,
in a speech made prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court, that he recognized the
role "in important human affairs the superintending care and control of the great gover-
nor of the universe." Hentoff, supra note 2, at 62.
12. Brennan Hearings, supra note 11, at 34.
13. Jeffrey T. Leeds, A Life on the Court, N.Y. TIMES MAC., Oct. 5, 1986, at 79.
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DespiteJustice Brennan's own views, at least one scholar has spec-
ulated that his strict separationist decisions were influenced by his up-
bringing as an Irish-American Catholic and two powerful twentieth
century cultural beliefs: the melting pot theory and the need to
"Americanize" Catholics for acceptance into the predominantly Prot-
estant middle class. 14 Other commentators, however, have suggested
the contrary. They believe that Justice Brennan rejected his ethnic
and religious roots.'5 As Justice Brennan himself once observed, "I
have been a disappointment to some Roman Catholics."16 "Father An-
drew Greeley wrote a piece in which he said that if the Roman
Catholics who played a role in Brennan's selection had had any idea
he would turn out the way he did, he would never have been
appointed. "17
This Article examines whether Justice Brennan's contention that
his objective legal approach to constitutional interpretation, and not
his personal religious beliefs, influenced his resolution of church-state
conflicts. Because he never wrote an article or published a speech
about the separation of church and state, this analysis focuses on the
twenty opinions (six majority, one plurality, five concurring, and ten
dissenting, at least in part) authored by Justice Brennan in cases in-
volving the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.18 This Arti-
cle concludes that Justice Brennan was not primarily influenced by
traditional Catholic views in his decisions construing the Establish-
ment Clause.
The analysis is divided into four parts. Part I provides a brief back-
ground of Justice Brennan's life prior to the time of his appointment.
Part II discusses Justice Brennan's Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence. Specifically, Part II examines his jurisprudence in terms of the
Warren Court (1956-69), the Burger Court and the Lemon test 9 era
(1970-82), and his presence as a strict separationist on an accom-
modationist Court (1983-90). Part III compares the official position
14. See Michael Ariens, On the Road of Good Intentions: Justice Brennan and the Religion
Clauses, 27 CAL. W. L. REV. 311, 312 (1991).
15. See Leeds, supra note 13, at 79.
16. Id. Indeed, Father William F. Davis noted that, upon Brennan's death, many in
the Catholic Church did not want his body shown in the Washington Cathedral. See Inter-
view with William F. Davis, O.S.F.S., Representative for Catholic Schools and Federal Assis-
tance in the Department of Education of the United States Catholic Conference, in
Washington, D.C. (Aug. 5, 1999).
17. Leeds, supra note 13, at 79.
18. See infra Part II.
19. The "L..emon test" was developed in and named for the decision in Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), discussed infra Part II.B.
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of the American Catholic Church, as determined by the National Con-
ference of Catholic Bishops, 2° to Justice Brennan's interpretation of
the Establishment Clause. This Part focuses primarily on school prayer
and public assistance to parochial schools. Finally, Part III discusses
these findings and suggests other possible explanations for Justice
Brennan's Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
I. William J. Brennan, Jr.: A Biographical Sketch
Traditionally, Supreme Court justices possess certain traits or
characteristics that make them appear destined to sit on the nation's
highest court. Some of these traits include lineage, participation on
law review, a prestigious prejudicial career, or a clerkship with the
High Court itself. On the present Court, for example, Justice David
Souter was a Rhodes Scholar, studying law and philosophy at Magda-
len College, Oxford. 21 Antonin Scalia served as note editor of the
Harvard Law Review.22 Ruth Bader Ginsburg founded, in 1971, the Wo-
men's Rights Project of the American Civil Liberties Union and con-
vinced the Supreme Court to use intermediate scrutiny for gender-
based classifications. 23 Chief Justice William Rehnquist served as a law
clerk to former Supreme CourtJustice RobertJackson. 24Justice Bren-
nan's background, on the other hand, differs from these traditional
standards.
Born in Newark, New Jersey, in 1906, William J. Brennan, Jr.
lacked the pedigree of Justice Souter, the journal experience of Jus-
tice Scalia, or the clerkship experience of Chief Justice Rehnquist. In-
deed, "[h]e was not one of those men .. .who are marked for their
brilliance early on, and who, even as they are finishing law school, are
spoken about with an unnatural (and often undeserved) reverence as
20. The position of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops is expressed through
the policy arm known as the United States Catholic Conference ("USCC"). See National
Conference of Catholic Bishops, at http://www.nccbuscc.org (last visited Mar. 12, 2001).
21. See, e.g., Barbara A. Perry, David Souter, in THE SUPREMES 87, 89 (1999). His educa-
tional credentials led his classmates in college to include, in a scrapbook containing what
they predicted for his future, the headline "David Souter Nominated to the Supreme
Court." Id.
22. See Barbara A. Perry, Antonin Scalia, in THE SUPREMES, supra note 21, at 57, 59.
Scalia also was valedictorian and graduated first at Georgetown in 1957. See id. at 58.
23. See Barbara A. Perry, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, in THE SUPREMES, supra note 21, at 115,
118. Ginsburg also has the unique distinction of serving on two ivy league law journals. See
id. at 116.
24. See Barbara A. Perry, William Rehnquist, in THE SUPREMES, supra note 21, at 9, 11.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Sandra Day O'Connor were classmates at Stanford. See id
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future Supreme Court justices." 25 Rather, William Brennan, known to
his friends simply as Bill, merely worked his way from an ordinary be-
ginning to become one of the most significant figures in American
legal history. 26
Brennan's father, William Brennan, Sr., immigrated to the
United States as part of the third wave of Irish-Catholic immigrants in
1893.27 Born in Frenchpark, Ireland, Bill, Sr. met his wife, Agnes Mc-
Dermott, in the United States. 28 They married in Newark, NewJersey,
in 1903 and had eight children, of whom Bill, Jr. was their second.29
Bill, Sr. began his career as a laborer and worked his way up in
the union hierarchy.30 In 1908, he became a business manager of his
union local. 3' One year later, the Essex County Trades and Labor
Council elected him president of the union. 32 From this position, Bill,
Sr. strived for better wages for trolley drivers by pushing for strikes.
33
It was in this position that he began his political career, "going from
union hall to union hall advocating 'unity and unionism,' often with
Agnes and young Bill Jr. at his side."34
Brennan's father had a tremendous impact on him growing up.
Indeed, Brennan once commented that "' [e]verything I am... I am
because of my father."' 35 Bill, Jr. watched as his father rose from the
ranks of union leader to transformer of the city's form of govern-
ment.36 Bill, Sr. continued his move up the ranks of politics, strength-
ening the local unions, until he became the city's most important
public official-the Commissioner of Public Safety.
3 7
25. David Halberstam, The Common Man as Uncommon Man, in REASON AND PASSION:
JUSTICE BRENNAN'S ENDURING INFLUENCE 22, 22 (E.Joshua Rozenkranz & Bernard Schwartz
eds., 1997).
26. See Bernard Schwartz, How Justice Brennan Changed America, in REASON AND PAS-
SION, supra note 25, at 31, 31.
27. See HUNTER R. CLARK, JUSTICE BRENNAN: THE GREAT CONCILIATOR 13 (1995).
28. See id.
29. See id. at 14-15.
30. See id. at 14.
31. See id. at 15.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. Id.
35. Leeds, supra note 13, at 26 (quoting Justice Brennan during an interview with
Jeffrey Leeds).
36. See CLARK, supra note 27, at 15-16. Newark had a mayor-alderman form of govern-
ment. See id. at 15. However, Bill, Sr. eventually transformed it into a mayor-council form.
See id. at 16.
37. See id. at 16.
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Bill, Sr.'s influence extended beyond teaching his son the value
of unions. Indeed, "the elder Brennan was determined to see his chil-
dren take full advantage of the opportunities America offered."38 Not
only did he teach his son the value of an education,3 9 he also incul-
cated in Bill, Jr. "an uncompromising work ethic."40 From the age of
eleven, Bill, Jr. contributed to the family income, "working every kind
of job in the world." 41 These jobs included such things as delivering
milk, delivering newspapers, and running up and down the aisles of
the trolley ensuring that everyone had exact change. 4 2
Bill, Sr. also gave his son a strong sense of his Irish Catholic heri-
tage. According to Brennan, "'[b]ack when I was growing up... there
were any number of Irish associations, and Irish affairs that my
mother and dad used to go to all the time." 43 Moreover, his father
kept him "well aware of not only the Friendly Sons but the Ancient
Order of Hibernians."'44 St. Patrick's Day was a huge holiday around
the Brennan household.45
Brennan's father was also empathetic to the plight of others. 46
Although Brennan attended Catholic schools as a youngster, he went
to public schools when parochial schools were not available. 4 7 After
graduating from public high school, Brennan attended the University
of Pennsylvania's Wharton School of Finance and Commerce. 48 He
graduated from Wharton in 1928 with honors and a degree in
economics. 49
Brennan then attended Harvard Law School, where he "struggled
at first to find his niche. '50 As a result of this struggle, Brennan was
not named to the Harvard Law Review.5 1 However, "although he was
38. Id.
39. According to the Justice himself, Bill, Sr. did not tolerate a lack of academic excel-
lence. See id. at 19-20. He expected his children to do well. See id. Indeed, he told a young
Bill that he would be a lawyer. See id. at 20. When his son was a law student at Harvard, it
was not uncommon for him to send telegrams to Bill,Jr. seeking information about grades.
See id. at 17.
40. Id. at 16.
41. Id.
42. See id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 20.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. Id. at 23.
51. See id.
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not the brightest star," Brennan joined the Harvard Legal Aid
Society.52
Brennan's participation in the Legal Aid Society had a profound
impact on him. As a member, Brennan "handle[d] actual cases and
practice[d] in court representing indigent clients in divorce, bank-
ruptcy, landlord-tenant, and other civil matters."53 The Legal Aid Soci-
ety provided Brennan with experience in "client counseling,
negotiating, and crafting litigation strategy."54 The experience ena-
bled Brennan, at an early age, to combine the theoretical education
taught by Harvard with his experience dealing with the real problems
faced by the indigent.55
Brennan's father died in 1930, leaving his family little money.5 6
After receiving his law degree in 1931, Brennan sought to provide for
his mother, wife, and younger siblings by taking a position with the
firm of Pitney, Hardin & Skinner.5 7 Ironically, Brennan represented
management in issues that were "on the cutting edge of the New
Deal."58 Brennan then served a brief stint as an ordnance officer in
the United States Army.59 Enlisting with the rank of major, Brennan's
main responsibility was dealing with labor resources. 60 In 1943, he be-
came the chief of the Army's Ordnance Department Civilian Person-
nel Division. 61
Brennan's Army experiences led to his introduction to congres-
sional testimony. In 1945, he was called to testify about problems in
the national defense program before the Mead Committee of the
United States Senate, established to investigate the national defense
program. 62 Here, then Lieutenant Colonel Brennan was forced to an-
swer questions about denying furloughs to certain individuals and
about shifting labor personnel to a questionable arms manufacturer.63
52. Id.
53. Id. at 23-24.
54. Id. at 24.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 24-25.
57. See id. at 26-27.
58. Id. at 28.
59. See id. at 29-30. The Ordnance Department had the task of procuring munitions
for the Army. See id, at 29.
60. See id. at 30.
61. See id. at 31. The Civilian Personnel Division, in charge of discharges and fur-
loughs, handled requests from industry for release of trained servicemen to handle person-
nel needs. See id. at 29.
62. See id.
63. See id.
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Brennan exculpated himself by sharing transcripts of phone conversa-
tions he had recorded. 64 When asked about this wiretapping, Brennan
replied: "It was just recording a telephone conversation. It served
many useful purposes."6 5
Brennan then returned to Pitney, Hardin. 66 After the deaths of
the two main partners, Shelton Pitney and John Ralph Hardin, Bren-
nan became the major "rainmaker" at the firm, also wearing the hat of
"ditch digger. ' 67 Initially, he functioned in both roles with confi-
dence. 68 Indeed, he continued to represent management in labor ne-
gotiations so well that he impressed his opponents. 69 Wearing two
hats, however, eventually tired the young Brennan.7v0
While he was still at Pitney, Hardin,71 Brennan's career turned
toward assisting New Jersey Supreme Court Chief Justice Arthur Van-
derbilt and Associate Justice, and former Harvard classmate, Nathan
Jacobs, in reforming the state's court system. 72 Brennan helped create
a system that, according to the future justice himself, "borrowed from
industry and commerce one of America's greatest contributions,
namely, the principles of business management which have done so
much to advance this nation to the place of the world's greatest pro-
ductive economy."73 Under the new system, which became a model
judicial system for the rest of the nation, NewJersey adopted the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure.7 4 The new rules created
an administrative system designed to keep track of the cases that de-
veloped through the system 75 and to hasten settlement.76
Once the state implemented Vanderbilt's reforms, Brennan, at
Vanderbilt's urging, left his lucrative private practice at Pitney, Hardin
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 35.
67. See id. at 36. "Ditch digger" was a term used to describe lawyers who put in "long
hours of grunt labor." Id. at 28.
68. See id. at 36.
69. See id. Ironically, although the leaders at the time did not look at Brennan as
necessarily a heavy hitter with a tremendous future, his union opponents viewed him as
someone "'who had the look of a guy who was really on his way up the ladder.'" Id. (quot-
ing Tom Dunn, future mayor of Elizabeth, New Jersey).
70. See id. at 43.
71. See id. at 45.
72. See id.
73. Jack Alexander, Mr. Justice from New Jersey, SATURDAY EVENING PosT, Sept. 28, 1957,
at 130.
74. See CLARK, supra note 27, at 47.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 47-48.
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to serve in the judiciary.77 In 1949, he became a judge in Hudson
County, 78 one of the most litigious and corrupt counties in NewJersey
at the time. 79 Just as he did as a practicing attorney, Brennan worked
late into the night.80 In fact, Brennan "[heard] trials in the afternoon
and then h[eld] court sessions at night" to ease the burden on the
trial calendar.81 Eighteen months later, after "cleaning up" Hudson
County, Brennan was elevated by the governor to New Jersey's inter-
mediate court, the appellate division.8 2
As an appellate judge, Brennan did not make any groundbreak-
ing decisions and heard no case that raised church-state issues.83
Nonetheless, Brennan did provide a preview of his penchant for pro-
tecting the rights of defendants and underdogs.8 4 In Palestroni v. Ja-
cobs,8 5 for example, Judge Brennan held that a judge ,erred, contrary
to well-established judicial practice, in allowing ajuror to look up the
word "wainscot" in the dictionary.8 6 According to Brennan, "[t]he
use... by ajury of a dictionary has an obvious potentiality for harmful
influence .... The danger is ever present [if] it may be employed to
ascertain meanings not just of one but of many words used in the
court's charge."8 7 Palestroni was probably Brennan's most noteworthy
opinion while on the appellate division.8
In 1952, Republican Governor Alfred Driscoll appointed Bren-
nan to the New Jersey Supreme Court.8 9 Joining his former col-
leagues, Chief Justice Arthur Vanderbilt and Associate Justice Nathan
Jacobs, Brennan continued to be "more interested in improving the
court system than in crusading for the underprivileged. '" 90 Rather
than focus on the dignity of the individual under the New Jersey Con-
77. See id. at 49-50.
78. See id. at 50, 52.
79. See EISLER, supra note 8, at 68.
80. See id. at 69.
81. Id.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 70-71.
85. 77 A.2d 183 (NJ. 1950).
86. See id. at 184-85; see also CLARK, supra note 27, at 53.
87. Palestroni, 77 A.2d at 186. See also EISLER, supra note 8, at 70.
88. He did, however, write an opinion that seemed opposite to his upbringing. In
Wilford v. Sigmund Eisner Co., 80 A.2d 222 (NJ. 1951), Brennan dismissed a claim by a coal-
miner that his long-term exposure to coal gave him lung problems. See id. at 226. Brennan
rejected the miner's claim, noting that "[o]ur careful examination of the transcripts leads
us to conclude that it is more than doubtful that he had a meritorious claim." Id.
89. See EISLER, supra note 8, at 71.
90. Id. at 78.
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stitution, Brennan "worked on reforms to shorten the time it took to
get a case to trial,"9' an important cause to ChiefJustice Vanderbilt.92
Brennan's position on individual rights began to change in 1953
when the court heard New Jersey v. Tune.93 In Tune, the defendant
signed a confession. 94 At trial, his attorney requested a copy of the
signed confession as well as other statements in the hands of the pros-
ecutors.95 The trial judge allowed the attorney access to the confes-
sion, but did not allow him to examine the defendant's other
statements.9
6
The New Jersey Supreme Court not only sustained the trial
court's conviction, but also held that the defendant could not view his
own confession. 97 Writing for the four-justice majority, Chief Justice
Vanderbilt noted that "we should remember that the people of this
State must also be protected. In weighing the rights of the individual
and those of the State we must not be carried away ... to such an
extent that the safety of the public is jeopardized." 98 Moreover, ac-
cording to Vanderbilt, "[t]o grant a defendant the unqualified right
to inspect his confession before trial would be to give him an opportu-
nity to . . .commit perjury at the expense of society."99
Justice Brennan, however, was uncomfortable with Vanderbilt's
position.'00 Foreshadowing his later opinions as a Supreme CourtJus-
tice, Brennan stated in his dissent that "[i] t shocks my sense of justice
that in these [circumstances], counsel for an accused facing a possible
death sentence should be denied inspection of his confession which,
were this a civil case, could not be denied."'' 1 Moreover, Brennan
wrote, "[t]o shackle counsel so that they cannot effectively seek out
the truth and afford the accused the representation which is not his
privilege but his absolute right seriously imperils our bedrock pre-
sumption of innocence."' 1 2 Although even his friend Nathan Jacobs
thought he went too far, Brennan wrote, over the course of the next
91. Id.
92. See id.
93. 98 A.2d 881 (NJ. 1953).
94. See id. at 883.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 886, 892-93.
98. Id. at 888.
99. Id. at 893.
100. See id. at 894-98 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 896 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 897 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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several years, opinions reflecting a "found-again liberal social
consciousness." 103
Brennan began to display his new liberal thinking publicly. On St.
Patrick's Day in 1954, before the Charitable Irish Society in Boston,
Brennan spoke out against Senator Joseph McCarthy's communist
"witch hunts."'1 4 Brennan's speech revealed "the cornerstones of...
his philosophy" as well as many of his views.'0 -5 He began by noting
that his father had taught him that "it was the Irish 'love of individual
liberty' that was one of the cornerstones of American freedom."' 0 6
Brennan compared the House Unamerican Activities Committee
hearings to the Salem witch trials.1 7 He implied that Senator Joseph
McCarthy "'deludes himself if he thinks he detects in some practices
in the contemporary scene, reminiscent of the Salem witch hunts, any
sign that our courage has failed us and that fear has palsied our hard
won concept of justice and fair play."' 108
Six months later, speaking at the Rotary Club in Monmouth, New
Jersey, Brennan continued his attack on McCarthyism and his advo-
cacy of civil liberties when he said: "'A system of inquisition on mere
suspicion or gossip without independent proofs tending to show guilt
is innately abhorrent to us."'" 0 9 He further noted that "' [t]he simple
and peaceful process of questioning breeds a readiness to resort to
bullying and even to physical force and torture."' 0 These views also
seem consistent with those lessons, taught to him by his father, con-
cerning the struggles of the Irish-Catholic people for freedom."'
Brennan's newly found liberalism, however, did not make him
lose favor in the eyes of Chief Justice Vanderbilt." 2 In 1956, a repre-
sentative to Attorney General Herbert Brownell asked the Chief Jus-
tice to speak about the New Jersey court reforms at a Justice
Department meeting.1'3 Vanderbilt, however, became ill and asked
103. EISLER, supra note 8, at 80.
104. See id. at 81. Ironically, Massachusetts was actually having a real witch hunt of their
own: that year the state senate upheld Ann Pudeator's 1692 conviction for witchcraft. See
id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See id.
108. Id. (quoting Brennan's address to the Charitable Irish Society in Boston).
109. Id. at 82 (quoting Brennan's address to the Monmouth Rotary Club).
110. Id. (quoting Brennan's address to the Monmouth Rotary Club).
111. Seeid. at81.
112. See id. at 82. This may be due, however, in part, to Brennan not being involved in
significant First Amendment cases while on the New Jersey Supreme Court.
113. See id. at 83.
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Brennan to deliver the speech. " 4 Brennan did so and "spoke convinc-
ingly about the need for court reform, particularly for processes such
as pretrial depositions that would speed litigation."' 1' He also advo-
cated "pretrial discovery and pretrial conferences, which tended to
weed out frivolous suits, as well as to speed up trials once they be-
gan." ' 16 The speech, conservative in nature, led Brownell to remark to
an Assistant Attorney General that "'[w] e might find something for
this guy.' "117
Brownell had the opportunity to "find something" for Brennan
upon the retirement of United States Supreme CourtJustice Sherman
Minton. 1 8 On September 26, 1956, Brownell called Brennan and
asked him to come to Washington, D.C. for a breakfast meeting with
President Eisenhower.' '9 At this meeting, Eisenhower told Brennan
that he would be nominated for Minton's seat on the Supreme
Court. 121 Eisenhower appointed Brennan because he was young, had
prior judicial experience, and was an Irish-Catholic Democrat, which
could help bolster Eisenhower's lead in the Northeast during the 1956
Presidential election. '21
Justice Brennan began his tenure on the United States Supreme
Court in October of 1956.122 As a recess appointee, he began to hear
cases immediately, prior to his confirmation by Congress. 123 In March
1957, the Senate, with only Senator Joseph McCarthy dissenting, fi-
nally confirmed him as an Associate Justice. 124
Brennan served thirty-four years on the Court. 25 Although he be-
gan his tenure in the middle of a liberal court, he retired as the most
liberal member of a conservative court. 126 During the course of his
tenure, Brennan protected the freedom of expression, the rights of
114. See id.
115. Id. at 84.
116. Id. at 85 (quoting Brennan's speech at the United States Department of Justice).
117. Id. (quoting Brownell's words to Assistant United States Attorney General William
Rogers),
118. See id. at 88.
119. See Grunes, supra note 2, at 282.
120. See id.
121. See id. (citing ABRAHAM, supra note 8, at 265-66).
122. See ABRAHAM, supra note 8, at 266.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 267.
126. See id.
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the poor, the rights of criminals, and the rights of various
minorities. 127
On July 20, 1990, citing poor health and the strenuous demands
of the Court, Justice Brennan notified President Bush of his resigna-
tion.128 The President nominated David Souter, with whom Brennan
remained friends until his death in 1996.129
II. Brennan's Church-State Jurisprudence: An Overview
Although a constant advocate of strict separation, Brennan did
not become the Court's chief spokesperson for this point of view until
well after the Warren Court era ended and presidents appointed more
conservative justices who favored greater accommodation between
government and religion.1 30 In the 1970s, Brennan often wrote con-
curring or dissenting opinions when the Burger Court supported and
implemented the three-pronged Lemon test 31 to decide Establishment
Clause cases. Yet, it was during the 1980s that Brennan's influence
apparently increased.1 32 Remarkably, he became both a stricter sepa-
rationist and a more regular spokesperson for the Court as President
Reagan packed the high tribunal with pro-accommodationists
through the elevation of William Rehnquist to Chief Justice, and the
appointments of Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, and
Anthony Kennedy.
Justice Brennan's success in promoting strict separationist opin-
ions during his last years on the Supreme Court can be attributed, in
part, to his well-documented "behind-the-scenes" skill as a master coa-
lition builder. 33 According to one scholar, "[a] lmost from the begin-
ning of his tenure on the Court, Justice Brennan was unusually
successful in drafting opinions just broad enough to gain the approval
of a majority without sacrificing libertarian values."' 34
127. See id. at 268.
128. See id. at 267.
129. See, e.g., David Souter, Justice Brennan's Place in Legal History, in REASON AND PAS-
SION, supra note 25, at 299, 309.
130. See generallyJon Veen, Note, Where Do We Go from Here? The Need for Consistent Estab-
lishment Clause Jurisprudence, 52 RUTGERS L. REv. 1195 (2000).
131. The "Lemon test" was developed in and named for the decision in Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
132. See infra Part II.C.
133. See Edward V. Heck, Justice Brennan and the Development of Obscenity Policy by the
Supreme Court, 18 CAL. W. L. REv. 410, 416 (1981).
134. Id.
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Brennan's advocacy of a higher wall of separation between
church and state, and the Court's corresponding unwillingness to
adopt an accommodationist approach, can be attributed, in part, to
the Court's reaction to the Reagan administration's heavy-handed at-
tempt to change the High Court's policy through lobbying by Edwin
Meese, Reagan's successor Solicitor General.13 5 In short, the Court
agreed with President Reagan's first Solicitor General who, shortly af-
ter his resignation, stated "[t]here has been this notion that my job is
to press the Administration's policies at every turn and announce true
conservative principles through the pages of my briefs. It is not. I'm
the Solicitor General, not the Pamphleteer General. ' 1 3 6
A. The Brennan Approach and the Warren Court 1959-1969
Although Brennan voted with the majority in striking down a
New York program under which students began each school day by
reciting a nondenominational prayer composed by the State's Board
of Regents in Engel v. Vitale,13 7 it was not until the 1963 case of Abing-
ton School District v. Schempp 38 that Brennan undertook a systematic
analysis of the First Amendment's prohibition that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion. '139
Described as the hardest decision he had to make on the
Court, 140 Justice Brennan's seventy-five page concurring opinion in
Schempp explained his agreement with the majority that state laws
mandating the reading of at least ten verses from the Bible, without
comment, and the recitation of the Lord's Prayer each day in public
schools violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 141
In what may be his earliest discussion of the limitations of "origi-
nal intent" jurisprudence, 142 Brennan argued it was inappropriate to
interpret the Establishment Clause solely on the basis of eighteenth
135. See generally Rodney A. Grunes, Lobbying the Supreme Court: Reagan's Solicitor General
and the Establishment Clause, 11 MIDSOUTH POL. Sci. J. 31 (1990). Edwin Meese, Reagan's
Solicitor General, viewed his role as restoring the original intent of the Framers. See Edwin
Meese III, Address, Construing the Constitution, in 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 22, 23-24 (1985).
136. LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND RULE OF LAW
107 (1988).
137. 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962).
138. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
139. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 241 (Brennan, J., concurring).
140. See EISLER, supra note 8, at 182.
141. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 241 (Brennan, J., concurring).
142. See id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
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century ideas.143 "[Aiwareness of history and an appreciation of the
aims of the Founding Fathers," Brennan explained, "do not always re-
solve concrete problems.' 144 Brennan further stated that, given the
profound changes with respect to religious diversity and educational
structure that have taken place since the adoption of the First Amend-
ment, practices which might have been acceptable during the time of
Madison and Jefferson might be highly offensive to both believers and
nonbelievers in today's more pluralistic society.' 45
Brennan did maintain, however, that the basic Establishment
Clause principles of the Framers were relevant in deciding contempo-
rary church-state disputes. 146 Brennan explained:
What the Framers meant to foreclose.., are those involvements of
religious [organizations] with secular institutions which (a) serve
the essentially religious activities of religious institutions; (b) em-
ploy the organs of government for essentially religious purposes; or
(c) use essentially religious means to serve governmental ends,
where secular means would suffice. 147
Using these principles, Brennan argued that the Establishment
Clause prohibits more than the creation of an official state church. 48
The Framers designed the Establishment Clause to prevent all "inter-
dependence" between religion and government. 149 This included
eliminating daily prayers and Bible reading in the public schools that,
although perhaps serving secular educational purposes, had always
been regarded as being basically religious exercises.150
For Brennan, keeping a strict separation between religion and
government benefited both institutions. As he explained, "[i]t is not
only the nonbeliever who fears the injection of sectarian doctrines
and controversies into the civil polity, but in as high degree it is the
devout believer who fears the secularization of a creed which becomes
too deeply involved with and dependent upon government."'' 51
Yet, Justice Brennan was not always willing, at least in 1963, to
keep church and state entirely separate. Forcefully arguing that the
143. See id. (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Whatever Jefferson or Madison would have
thought of Bible reading or the recital of the Lord's Prayer in what few public schools
existed in their day, our use of the history of their time must limit itself to broad purposes,
not specific practices.").
144. Id. at 234 (Brennan, J., concurring).
145. See id. at 241 (Brennan, J., concurring).
146. See id. at 294 (Brennan, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 294-95 (Brennan, J., concurring).
148. See id. at 233 (Brennan, J., concurring).
149. See id. at 236 (Brennan, J., concurring).
150. See iL at 293-94 (Brennan, J., concurring).
151. Id. at 259 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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Establishment Clause required government neutrality and not hostil-
ity toward religion, Brennan maintained that some forms of coopera-
tion br accommodation between religion and government were
constitutionally permissible. 52 To prohibit churches and chaplains at
military installations, for example, might run afoul of the free exercise
of religion that is also protected by the First Amendment. 153 Moreo-
ver, invocational prayers in legislative chambers, the non-devotional
use of the Bible in public schools, uniform tax exemptions that are
incidentally available to religious institutions, and activities that,
though religious in origin, have ceased to have religious meaning15 4
(for example, Sunday Laws, 155 inscribing "In God We Trust" on cur-
rency, and the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance) "might well re-
present no involvements of the kind prohibited by the Establishment
Clause." 156
While Brennanjoined the majority in several important Establish-
ment Clause cases, 157 it was not until 1969 that Brennan authored a
majority opinion concerning the Establishment Clause. In Presbyterian
Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyte-
rian Church,'58 the Court was asked to resolve a property dispute in-
volving two local Georgia churches that had withdrawn their
affiliation from a hierarchical general church organization because of
differences over church doctrine and practice. 15 9
Writing for a unanimous Court in Presbyterian Church, Justice
Brennan found that a Georgia law allowing a civil court to award dis-
puted property on the basis of its own interpretation of church doc-
trine violated the Establishment Clause as made applicable to the
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 60 "If civil courts undertake to resolve such controver-
sies," explained Brennan, "the hazards are ever present of inhibiting
the free development of religious doctrine and of implicating secular
152. See id. at 294 (Brennan, J., concurring).
153. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibit the free exercise thereof ....").
154. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 299-304 (Brennan, J., concurring).
155. In the Sunday Laws Cases, the Court found that state laws compelling a uniform
day of rest were not violations of the Establishment Clause. See id. at 263 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 240 (1961)).
156. Id. at 299 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
157. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.
97 (1968).
158. 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
159. See id. at 449.
160. See id.
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interests in matters of purely ecclesiastical concern."'16 1 Thus, Bren-
nan remained consistent with the views he expressed in Schempp--that
First Amendment values are jeopardized whenever the organs of gov-
ernment are used for essentially religious purposes.' 62
Brennan clarified his views on church-property disputes the fol-
lowing year when he wrote a concurring opinion in Maryland & Vir-
ginia Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharspburg,
Inc.,163 a case involving a property dispute between the general elder-
ship and two secessionist congregations of the Churches of God.164
Brennan emphasized that, with the exception of involving itself in
matters of ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith, the states
could pursue a variety of options to resolve these disputes without vio-
lating the First Amendment.1 65 For example, states could follow the
Court's 1872 decision in Watson v. Jones,16 6 which held that states
could enforce decisions made by a majority within a local congrega-
tion.1 6 7 Alternatively, when a church's general hierarchical organiza-
tion was involved, states could give preference to the decisions of the
highest authority of the hierarchy. 168 Another option would be for the
civil courts to utilize neutral principles of law, such as the formal title
doctrine, under which civil courts can resolve property disputes by ex-
amining deeds, reverter clauses, and the state's general corporation
laws.' 69 Finally, Brennan suggested that the states could pass carefully
drawn special statutes governing church property arrangements.17 11
Returning again to the Establishment Clause framework articu-
lated in Schempp,17 ' Justice Brennan wrote a lengthy concurring opin-
ion in Walz v. Tax Commission,172 regarding the Court's decision to
sustain the constitutionality of a New York statute that provided a tax
exemption to religious as well as to other charitable organizations. 173
161. Id.
162. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294-95 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
163. 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
164. See id. at 367.
165. See id. at 368 (Brennan, J., concurring).
166. 13 Wall. 679 (1871).
167. See Maryland & Virginia Eldership, 396 U.S. at 368 (Brennan,J., concurring) (citing
Watson, 13 Wall. at 724).
168. See id. at 368-69 (Brennan, J., concurring).
169. See id. at 370 (Brennan, J., concurring).
170. See id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
171. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294-95 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
172. 397 U.S. 664, 680-94 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
173. See id. at 680.
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In the process, Brennan sought to limit the sweep of Chief Justice
Warren Burger's majority opinion that suggested there was "room for
play" in the First Amendment's religious clauses and that the Court
should adopt an attitude of "benevolent neutrality" when assessing
governmental attempts to accommodate religion. 174
For Justice Brennan, property tax exemptions for religious insti-
tutions should be sustained, but on a much narrower basis.175 First,
Brennan found the long uninterrupted history of support for tax ex-
emptions to be "compelling" and "overwhelming." 176 The earliest ex-
emptions were adopted without controversy; no federal or state court
had ever held that tax exemptions constituted an establishment of
religion. 177
Second, Brennan noted that the purpose of granting a tax ex-
emption to religious organizations was secular, not religious. 78 Ex-
emptions are designed to promote the well-being of the community
and diversity within society.179 Most important, since the exemptions
are available to all nonprofit organizations, including those that are
religious, any benefit to religion could be seen as being merely
incidental. 18 0
Finally, Brennan argued that tax exemptions are "qualitatively"
different than general subsidies and that assessing property taxes
against religious organizations would inevitably result in greater en-
tanglement of government and religion.' 18 Thus, using the Schempp
analysis, Brennan concluded that property tax exemptions do not "[1]
serve the essentially religious activities of religious institutions[,] ...
[2] employ the organs of government for essentially religious pur-
poses, . . . [or 3] use essentially religious means to serve governmental
ends, where secular means would suffice."' 8 2
174. Id. at 669. See also id. at 680-81 (Brennan, J., concurring); Stephen G. Gey, Why Is
Religion Special? Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment, 52 U. Pirr. L. REv. 75, 100 (1990).
175. See Walz, 397 U.S. at 691 (Brennan, J., concurring).
176. See id. at 681 (BrennanJ., concurring).
177. See id. at 684-85 (Brennan, J., concurring).
178. See id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring).
179. See id. at 687-89 (Brennan, J., concurring).
180. See id. at 693-94 (Brennan, J., concurring).
181. See id. at 691 (Brennan, J., concurring).
182. Id. at 692-93 (Brennan,J., concurring).
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B. Application of the Lemon Test 1971-1982
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,1 3 the Court began using a three-pronged
test for resolving Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 184 As set forth
by ChiefJustice Burger for a nearly unanimous Court, a statute is valid
if (1) it has "a valid secular legislative purpose," (2) its "primary ef-
fect ... neither advances nor inhibits religion," and (3) there is no
"excessive governmental entanglement with religion."18 5 Applying this
test, the Court invalidated Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes au-
thorizing the use of public tax monies to supplement or reimburse
the salaries of teachers of secular subjects in private, including paro-
chial, elementary schools. 186 These programs, explained Burger, vio-
lated the third part of the Court's new Establishment Clause test.187
The Court used this same analytical tool in Tilton v. Richardson,188
decided the same day as Lemon.189 In Tilton, the Supreme Court sus-
tained the portion of the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963190
that authorized the awarding of federal grants to build secular aca-
demic facilities at church-related colleges and universities.19' Only the
Act's provision allowing federally-funded buildings to be used for sec-
tarian purposes after twenty years was found to violate the Establish-
ment Clause. 1 92
In his concurring opinion in Lemon, however, Justice Brennan
stated that he would have invalidated all three programs, including
the federal grant program. 193 Unlike the majority, he found no differ-
ence between allowing governmental assistance to church-related ele-
mentary schools and allowing such assistance to colleges. 194 In his
view, all such programs had a similar constitutional infirmity: they pro-
vided a "direct subsidy from public funds for activities carried on by
sectarian educational institutions."1 95
183. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
184. See id. at 612-13.
185. Id.
186. See id. at 606-07.
187. See id. at 615.
188. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
189. See Tilton, 403 U.S. at 672; Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602.
190. 20 U.S.C. §§ 701-721 (repealed 1972).
191. See Tilton, 403 U.S. at 689.
192. See id.
193. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 661 (Brennan, J., concurring). The concurring opinion in
Lemon was also applicable to Tilton. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 642 (Brennan., J., concurring).
194. See id. at 659-60 (Brennan, J., concurring).
195. Id. at 643 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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As a result, -Brennan believed that the Court's prior decisions in
Everson v. Board ofEducation l96 and Board of Education v. Allen, 197 where
benefits in the challenged programs had been made directly to par-
ents or schoolchildren, were inapplicable to Lemon.198 Rather, in Til-
ton, public funds were given directly to sectarian institutions.' 99 Thus,
Brennan concluded that the aid to such institutions violated the Es-
tablishment Clause.211° As Brennan noted in his separate opinion in
Lemon, "subsidies of tax monies directly to a sectarian institution nec-
essarily aid the proselytizing function of the institution." 20 '
Brennan's main objections to these programs, however, were the
dangers to education and religion caused by government monitoring
and entanglement. 202 "The picture of state inspectors prowling the
halls of parochial schools and auditing classroom instruction surely
raises more than an imagined specter of governmental 'secularization
of a creed.'"213 In short, as he warned in Schempp, the Establishment
Clause prohibits the state from using religious institutions to further
its secular educational goals, "at least without the clearest demonstra-
tion that nonreligious means will not suffice."2°4
Until 1975, Brennan continued his opposition to all governmen-
tal programs designed to assist sectarian institutions and private
school students.2 05 Unlike the Court, however, he relied on the ap-
proach he developed in Schempp rather than the newly formed Lemon
test.2116 In Hunt v. McNair,2117 Brennan dissented from the Court's deci-
sion that South Carolina's program of issuing revenue bonds to help
finance construction at a Baptist-controlled college passed muster
under the Establishment Clause.20 8 Although the program involved
no direct state assistance to the sectarian institution, Brennan argued
that the provisions for "'continuing financial relationships or depen-
dencies,' 'annual audits,' 'governmental analysis,' and 'regulation and
196. 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (allowing public monies to be spent on transportation to private
and parochial schools).
197. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
198. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 644 (Brennan, J., concurring).
199. See id. at 643 (Brennan, J., concurring).
200. See id. at 659 (Brennan, J., concurring).
201. Id. (BrennanJ., concurring).
202. See id. at 650-51 (Brennan, J., concurring).
203. Id. at 650 (Brennan, J., concurring).
204. Id. at 659 (Brennan,J., concurring) (quoting Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 265 (1963) (BrennanJ., concurring)).
205. See, e.g., Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 749-50 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
206. See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
207. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
208. See id. at 749-50 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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surveillance"' created the very kind of "'intimate continuing relation-
ship or dependency between government and religiously affiliated in-
stitutions' that in the plurality's view was lacking in Tilton."20 9
Justice Brennan began interpreting and applying the Lemon test
in Meek v. Pittenger.210 Here, Brennan agreed with the Court that a
Pennsylvania statute authorizing the direct loan of instructional
materials and equipment and providing auxiliary services211 to non-
public schools violated the "primary effect" prong of Lemon since most
qualifying schools were religious in nature.2 12 However, he dissented
from the judgment sustaining the constitutionality of a textbook loan
program that made books which were permissible in public schools
available to schoolchildren attending nonpublic, primarily religious-
oriented schools. 213
According to Brennan, the three-factor Establishment Clause test
had evolved over fifty years of the Court's consideration of the issue of
state aid to church-related educational institutions.214 The signifi-
cance of Lemon, however, was the adding, without the Court's express
acknowledgment, of a "significant" fourth prong, the "divisive political
potential," that was to be used in determining the permissibility of
state subsidies to sectarian educational institutions.2 15 For Brennan,
the political divisiveness addition to the Lemon test was crucial to de-
termining the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's textbook loan pro-
gram being considered in Meek.216 In his view, the program was
designed to relieve "the desperate financial plight of nonpublic, pri-
marily parochial, schools," not to benefit the state's students. There-
fore, the program proved to have a politically divisive purpose. 217
In addition to the Court's failure in Meek to even consider politi-
cal divisiveness, Brennan chided the plurality for relying on Allen.2 18
Unlike Allen, noted Brennan, Pennsylvania required a substantial and
impermissible amount of state administrative involvement with non-
209. Id. at 754 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672,
688 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
210. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
211. These services included such things as counseling, testing, and psychological ser-
vices. See id. at 352-53.
212. See id. at 383-84 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
213. See id. at 378-79 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
214. See id. at 373 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
215. See id at 374 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
216. See id. at 378 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
217. Id. at 382 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
218. See id. at 384 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
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public schools. 219 This was not a program that benefited students,
Brennan explained.2 2° Rather, it was one that primarily benefited
church-related schools. 22 ' Therefore, the statute also violated the "pri-
mary effects" prong of Lemon.222
One year later, Brennan again applied the Lemon test more
strictly than the Court's plurality when, dissenting in Roemer v. Board of
Public Works, 2 2 3 he found that a Maryland program that provided an-
nual, non-categorical grants to private, mostly Catholic, colleges for
nonsectarian purposes violated the Establishment Clause. 224 Relying
on his opinions in Schempp and Lemon, Brennan reiterated his view
that the First Amendment prohibits government from providing di-
rect subsidies for activities, including secular activities, at church-re-
lated educational institutions. 225 Such payments from public funds
impermissibly advance religion, create "too close a proximity" be-
tween government and religion, and create a real danger of the "secu-
larization of a creed."226
The following year, in his dissenting opinion in Wolman v. Wal-
ter,2 2 7 Brennan applied the Lemon test to find unconstitutional every
provision of a far-reaching Ohio law authorizing the state to provide
students of nonpublic schools with books, instructional materials and
equipment, standardized testing and scoring, diagnostic services, ther-
apeutic services, and field trip transportation. 228 Justice Brennan dis-
sented from the Court's decision to uphold all but the instructional
materials and equipment and field trip transportation provisions.2 29
The scope of the statute and the amount of state funding of sectarian
schools convinced him that "a divisive political potential of unusual
magnitude inheres in the Ohio program."2 30
219. See id. at 379 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
220. See id. at 379-80 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
221. See id. (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
222. See id. at 383 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
223. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
224. See id. at 772 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
225. See id. at 770-71 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 642, 659-60 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 236, 294-95 (1963) (Brennan,J., concurring)).
226. Id. at 772 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 649 (Brennan, J.,
concurring)).
227. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
228. See id. at 255-56 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
229. See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 256 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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While Brennan had written important concurring and dissenting
opinions previously, it was not until the 1982 case of Larson v. Va-
lente,231 that Brennan had the opportunity to write a majority opinion
applying the Lemon test in an Establishment Clause case.2 32 Surpris-
ingly, he failed to do so.23 3
Brennan agreed with the Unification Church that Minnesota's
charitable contributions law, which exempted from certain registra-
tion and reporting requirements only those religious organizations
that receive more than fifty percent of their funds from nonmembers,
violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 234 In his
view, this law violated the essence of the Establishment Clause because
the government had given preference to one religious denomination
over another.235 When this occurs, Brennan explained, the statute
must be invalidated unless the state can demonstrate "a compelling
governmental interest"236 which was "closely fitted to further that in-
terest."237 This was not done here.238 Although protecting citizens
from unscrupulous charitable solicitations was found to be compel-
ling,239 Brennan maintained that the fifty percent rule was neither
logically nor closely fitted to serve that interest.240
Justice Brennan returned to the problem of state involvement in
church disputes in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich.241
Writing for the Court,242 Brennan again called for a strict separation
between government and the decisions of a hierarchical church. 243
He found that decisions concerning the appointment and removal of
a bishop, the validity of church reorganization, the fraud, collusion, or
arbitrariness of ecclesiastical decisions, and the control over church
property exercised by a defrocked diocesan bishop, were matters
which must be left to the church judicatory rather than to the state's
civil courts.244
231. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
232. See id. at 230.
233. See id. at 252.
234. See id. at 246-47.
235. See id. at 250-51 (citing Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 116-17 (1943)).
236. Id. at 247 (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1943)).
237. Id.
238. See id. at 251.
239. See id. at 248.
240. See id. at 255.
241. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
242. See id. at 697.
243. See id. at 724-25.
244. See id. at 713.
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Two jurisdictional decisions complete this period. In National La-
bor Relations Board v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,245 Justice Brennan dis-
sented from the Court's decision that the National Labor Relations
Board ("NLRB") lacked jurisdiction to resolve disputes brought by lay
teachers in two Catholic high schools.2 46 While Justice Brennan main-
tained that the National Labor Relations Act permitted the NLRB to
exercise jurisdiction, he failed to resolve whether this would be consti-
tutionally permissible under the religion clauses of the First
Amendment.2 47
Finally, in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for the
Separation of Church & State, Inc.,248 Justice Brennan dissented from
the Court's finding that a strict separationist organization lacked
standing to challenge the constitutionality of transferring federally-
owned "surplus property" to a church-related college. 249 Arguing that
important Establishment Clause rights were at stake,250 Brennan
noted in his dissent that the Court erred in refusing to rely on Flast v.
Cohen,251 which would have permitted the Court to reach the merits of
the case..25 2
C. Strict Separation on an Accommodationist Court 1983-1990
During his last six years on the Court, Justice Brennan made a
concerted effort to thwart the Reagan administration's attempt to
have the Court abandon the Lemon test and adopt an approach that
permitted the government to accommodate, if not promote, religion
in American life. 253 In Marsh v. Chambers,254 a six-justice majority255
found that the Establishment Clause was not violated by Nebraska's
practice of opening state legislative sessions with a prayer offered by a
Presbyterian clergyman who had been paid for sixteen years with pub-
245. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
246. See id. at 508 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
247. See id. at 518 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
248. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
249. See id. at 482, 490 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
250. See id. at 513 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
251. 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968) (establishing a two-pronged formula to determine tax-
payer standing).
252. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 510-11 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
253. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). The Reagan administration's
efforts to promote accommodation were effected through judicial appointments and in
briefs and arguments presented by the Solicitor General.
254. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
255. See id. at 784.
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lic funds.256 Writing for the Court,257 Chief Justice Burger adopted
the Solicitor General's argument 258 that the legislative prayer should
be upheld on the basis of history and original intent instead of the
three-pronged Lemon framework used by the lower courts. 25 9
Justice Brennan's dissent represents his most comprehensive ex-
amination of the Establishment Clause since Schempp. Moreover, his
admission that he had been "wrong" in that case 2 1° has become a text-
book example of judicial statesmanship and courage. 261 As Brennan
explained:
I have come to the conclusion that I was wrong then and that the
Court is wrong today. I now believe that the practice of official in-
vocational prayer.., is unconstitutional. It is contrary to the doc-
trine as well [as] the underlying purposes of the Establishment
Clause, and it is not saved either by its history or by any of the
other considerations suggested in the Court's opinion. 262
Unlike the Court, Brennan maintained that the constitutionality
of legislative prayers should have been determined through an appli-
cation of the Lemon test.2 63 In his view, this was not a close issue.
26 4
Almost any group of law students, Brennan noted sarcastically, would
"nearly unanimously" find that the invocation of divine guidance on a
government body would involve a religious and not a secular purpose,
would have a primary effect that was "clearly religious," and would
involve excessive entanglement between government and religion in
that selection of a "suitable" chaplain would likely produce the kind of
"political divisiveness" that the Establishment Clause was designed to
prevent.2 65
Justice Brennan also examined the "underlying function" of the
Establishment Clause and the forces that shaped its doctrine.266 Citing
his Lemon opinion, Brennan noted that the Establishment Clause rep-
resented a "statement about the proper role of government" in a society
where history has demonstrated that religion "'must be a private mat-
256. See id. at 784-86.
257. See id. at 784.
258. See id. at 792; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 32, Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (No. 82-23).
259. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786.
260. See id. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
261. See Richard S. Arnold, Mr. Justice Brennan-An Appreciation, 26 HARVARD C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 7, 10-11 (1991).
262. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
263. See id. at 796-97 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
264. See id. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
265. See id. at 799-801 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
266. See id. at 801-02 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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ter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of private
choice. "' 267 He identified separation and neutrality as the basic princi-
ples underlying the Establishment Clause, which serves four impor-
tant purposes: (1) guaranteeing the individual's right to conscience;
(2) keeping government from interfering in the autonomy of relig-
ious life; (3) preventing the trivialization and degradation of religion
by an overly close attachment to state institutions; and (4) minimizing
the chances of religious issues becoming divisive in the political
arena.
268
Finally, Brennan suggested in Marsh that the Court had a mis-
guided view of the intent of the Framers, the First Amendment, and
the Constitution.2 69 According to Brennan:
The Constitution is not a static document whose meaning on every
detail is fixed for all time by the life experience of the Framers ....
Our primary task must be to translate "the majestic generalities of
the Bill of Rights, conceived as part of the pattern of liberal govern-
ment in the eighteenth century into concrete restraints on officials
dealing with the problems of the twentieth century. '270
Justice Brennan dissented again in Lynch v. Donnelly,271 known as
the Rhode Island nativity scene case. 2 72 In Lynch, a five-justice major-
ity, relying on a long unbroken history of governmental acknowledg-
ment of religion and public subsidizing of holidays with religious
significance, voted to uphold state support of a nativity scene in Paw-
tucket, Rhode Island's annual Christmas display. 27 For Brennan, the
problem was largely one of trying to limit the damage caused by yet
another attack on the strict separation principle. 274 Although the
Court had rejected the Solicitor General's advice to avoid the "analytic
overkill" of Lemon,275 the Chief Justice agreed with the Reagan admin-
istration that the Establishment Clause did not require the complete
separation of church and state, but rather mandated benevolent neu-
267. Id. at 802 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
625 (1971)).
268. See id. at 803-06 (Brennan,J., dissenting); see also DONALD L. DRAKEMAN, CHURCH-
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 26-27 (1991).
269. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 814-16 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
270. Id. at 816-17 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting W. Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Bar-
nette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943)).
271. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
272. See id. at 670-71.
273. See id. at 670, 687.
274. See id. at 694-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
275. See id. at 678-85; Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 3, Lynch v. Don-
nelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (No. 82-1256).
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trality and accommodation. 276 Emphasizing that the creche should be
viewed in the context of the Christmas holiday season,277 the Court
concluded that the celebration of a national holiday was a valid secu-
lar purpose,2 78 that the primary effect advanced religion no more
than hundreds of religious paintings hanging in publicly supported
museums, 279 and that any benefit to a particular religion was "indi-
rect," "remote," and "incidental. "280
Justice Brennan disagreed with both the Court's use of history
and its application of the Lemon test.281 Pointing out there was no
"widespread celebration" of Christmas when the Establishment Clause
was adopted,28 2 Brennan argued it was impossible for the Court to
know what the Framers' views would be on the constitutionality of the
nativity scenes.2 83 Most importantly, under Brennan's view, even a
generally accepted historical practice is subject to contemporary Es-
tablishment Clause analysis.284 After applying the Lemon test in a
much stricter manner than the majority of the Court,285 Brennan de-
termined that Pawtucket's seasonal display of a creche lacked a valid
secular purpose,28 6 had a primary effect which advanced the
majoritarian Christian religion,287 and, to the extent that this contro-
versy might result in political divisiveness among non-Christian minor-
ities, it fostered excessive governmental entanglement with
religion.2 88
Although Brennan voted to strike down Minnesota's tax deduc-
tion plan289 and Alabama's silent moment for meditation and prayer
statute, 290 he wrote no opinions in those cases. 291 However, Brennan
spoke for the Court in two controversial 1985 parochial aid decisions
276. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 672-73.
277. See id. at 679.
278. See id. at 681.
279. See id. at 683.
280. Id. (quoting Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
771 (1973)).
281. See id. at 696-97 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
282. See id. at 720 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
283. See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
284. See id at 721-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
285. See id. at 697-704 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
286. See id. at 698 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
287. See id. at 701 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
288. See id. at 702 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
289. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 404 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
290. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 39, 61 (1985).
291. See id. at 39; Mueller, 463 U.S. at 389.
Spring 20011]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
that again supported a strict separation of church and state. 29 2 In
Grand Rapids School District v. Ball,293 the Court affirmed a lower court
ruling which invalidated two programs, known as "Shared Time" and
"Community Education," which used public school teachers to pro-
vide remedial and enrichment classes to nonpublic school children, at
public expense, in classrooms located in and leased from the nonpub-
lic schools. 294 While Shared Time teachers were full-time employees of
the public schools,29 5 Community Education teachers were part-time
public school employees who were regularly employed full time by
parochial and other nonpublic schools. 29 6
Writing for the Court,29 7 Justice Brennan stated that the chal-
lenged programs should be measured against the Lemon test crite-
ria.29 8 In his view, the programs violated the "primary effect" prong of
Lemon in three ways.29 9 First, there was a "a substantial risk of state-
sponsored indoctrination" since no effort was made to monitor the
programs for religious content.300 Second, the programs advanced re-
ligion through the establishment of a symbolic link between govern-
ment and religion.30' "Government promotes religion," explained
Brennan, "as effectively when it fosters a close identification of its pow-
ers and responsibilities with those of any-or all-religious denomina-
tions as when it attempts to inculcate specific religious doctrines. '30 2
Moreover, the symbolism is likely to adversely affect the impressiona-
ble minds of schoolchildren. 30 3 Third, the programs violated the Es-
292. SeeAguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373 (1985).
293. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
294. See id. at 397-98.
295. See id. at 376.
296. See id. at 377.
297. See id. at 374. The Community Education program was struck down by a seven-to-
two vote, with Justices Rehnquist and White dissenting. See id. at 398-400 (separate opin-
ions by Burger, C.J. and O'Connor, J.); id. at 400-01 (White, J., dissenting; Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). The Shared Time program, on the other hand, was invalidated by a five-to-four
vote with ChiefJustice Burger and Associate Justices White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor dis-
senting. See id. at 398-401 (separate opinions by Burger, C.J., O'Connor, J., White, J., and
Rehnquist, J.).
298. See id. at 382.
299. See id. at 397.
300. Id. at 387.
301. See id. at 390.
302. Id. at 389.
303. See id. at 391-92 (citing Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment and
Doctrinal Development Part II. The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 574
(1968)).
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tablishment Clause because they promoted religion by providing, in
effect, a direct cash subsidy to the church-related schools.
30 4
The Court reached a similar decision in Aguilar v. Felton,30 5 invali-
dating a remedial program under which New York City used federal
funds, received under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act,
to pay public employees who taught disadvantaged students in both
religious and public schools. 306 Specifically, the Court rejected the So-
licitor General's argument that the Constitution permitted the gov-
ernment to offer "remedial assistance to educationally deprived
children in their own schools.
'3 0 7
Writing for the five-justice majority in Aguilar,0 Justice Brennan
concentrated on the problem raised by governmental monitoring of
publicly funded instruction in nonpublic schools. 0 9 In his view, this
monitoring violated the "excessive entanglement" prong of the Lemon
test.3 1 0 Moreover, this entanglement was unavoidable because "[i]n
short, the religious school, which has as a primary purpose the ad-
vancement and preservation of a particular religion must endure the
ongoing presence of state personnel whose primary purpose is to
monitor teachers and students in an attempt to guard against the infil-
tration of religious thought.
3 1
'
Justice Brennan spoke again for the Court in Edwards v. Aguil-
lard, 3 12 when, in a seven-to-two decision, it struck down Louisiana's
Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science
Act.3 13 Claiming as its sole purpose the protection of academic free-
dom, 314 this law mandated that creation science, "the scientific evi-
dences [for creation or evolution] and inferences from those
scientific evidences," be given balanced treatment whenever evolution
was taught in public schools.
3 15
In his sweeping majority opinion, Brennan maintained in Aguil-
lard that the Louisiana creationism statute failed to pass constitutional
304. See id. at 395-96.
305. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
306. See id. at 404-06, 408.
307. Brief of the United States as Appellant at 18, Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 408
(1985) (No. 84-237).
308. See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 403.
309. See id. at 409.
310. See id. at 413.
311. Id.
312. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
313. See id. at 582.
314. See id. at 581.
315. Id.
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muster under the three-pronged Lemon test.316 Specifically, Brennan
agreed with the lower federal courts that the legislature failed to assert
a valid secular purpose.3 17 "The preeminent purpose of [the law],"
explained Brennan, was not to promote academic freedom, but "to
advance the religious viewpoint that a supernatural being created hu-
mankind. ' 31 8 If Louisiana wanted to promote academic freedom, pos-
ited Brennan, "it would have encouraged the teaching of all scientific
theories on human origins."3 1 9 And why was the teaching of creation
science required only when evolution was taught?320
To support his view on the real purpose of the Balanced Treat-
ment Act, Brennan noted the "historic and contemporaneous link"
between the teaching of evolution and fundamentalist religious de-
nominations.321 He also noted that the legislative history of the statute
demonstrated an endorsement of a religious view hostile to evolu-
tion.322 Any endorsement of religion, Brennan noted, was prohibited
by the Establishment Clause. 323
Use of the endorsement language was not accidental. In Lynch v.
Donnelly,324 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor proposed modifying the first
two prongs of the Lemon test with a test prohibiting "government [al]
endorsement or disapproval of religion."32 5 In Aguillard, Brennan suc-
cessfully gained O'Connor's support for the majority opinion relating
to endorsement. 326
A very different kind of church-state dispute arose in Corporation
of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos. 3 27 In Amos, the Supreme Court unanimously held that exempt-
ing the secular nonprofit activities of religious organizations from the
religious anti-discrimination requirements of Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act did not violate the Establishment Clause. 328 Thus, it
was not a violation for the Mormon Church to fire several employees
316. See id. at 585-94.
317. See id. at 585-86.
318. Id. at 591.
319. Id. at 588.
320. See id. at 589.
321. See id. at 590.
322. See id. at 591-92.
323. See id. at 593.
324. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
325. Id. at 691 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
326. See Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 579. The endorsement language is set forth in Aguillard at
Section III of the opinion. See id. at 585-94.
327. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
328. See id. at 329-30.
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of church-owned corporations because they failed to satisfy the re-
quirements of church membership. 329
Justice Brennan concurred,330 viewing Lemon as inapplicable in
cases involving confrontation between the rights of religious organiza-
tions and those of individuals. 331 "Sensitivity to individual religious
freedom dictates that religious discrimination be permitted only with
respect to employment in religious activities." 332
The loss of support for Justice Brennan's strict separationist ap-
proach became evident in two cases decided in his last year on the
Court. In Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,333 only Justices Marshall and
Stevens joined Brennan's plurality opinion striking down a Texas stat-
ute that provided a sales tax exemption limited to religious periodi-
cals.3 34 The statute violated the Establishment Clause, according to
Brennan, because religious publications were preferred by the govern-
ment over nonreligious ones.335 Arguing that the state must demon-
strate a secular aim, Brennan indicated that a tax exemption scheme
could pass constitutional muster if, for example, "all groups that con-
tributed to the community's cultural, intellectual, and moral better-
ment" were eligible for the benefit. 3- 6
Justice Brennan's last Establishment Clause opinion was written
in Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union,337 another Christmas dis-
play case.338 In Allegheny, the Court held, by a five-to-four margin, that
a crhe displayed in the most public part of the county courthoise
and bearing a banner proclaiming "Gloria in Excelsis Deo!," meaning
"Glory to God in the Highest!," constituted an endorsement of relig-
ion in violation of the Establishment Clause.339 While Brennan con-
curred in this judgment,3 40 he dissented from the Court's decision
that the display of a Chanukah menorah next to a Christmas tree just
outside the city-county building, which included a mayoral statement
saluting the festive lights of freedom, passed constitutional muster
329. See id. at 330, 335.
330. See id. at 340 (Brennan, J., concurring).
331. See id. at 340 & n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring).
332. Id. at 345 (Brennan, J., concurring).
333. 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
334. See id. at 5.
335. See id. at 15.
336. Id.
337. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
338. See id. at 578.
339. See id. at 578, 621.
340. See i& at 637 (Brennan,J., concurring and dissenting).
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under Lemon.341 Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun noted that,
while the menorah is a religious symbol, displaying it with the Christ-
mas tree, "the preeminent secular symbol of the Christmas holiday
season," along with the mayor's statement, it becomes more of a sym-
bol of cultural diversity and part of the celebration of the winter holi-
days than an endorsement of religious faith. 342
Ever the coalition builder, Brennan joined Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion concerning the applicability of her endorsement
test.3 3  However, in his separate opinion, Brennan criticized
O'Connor and Blackmun for their application of this test to the facts
of Allegheny.344 Disagreeing with the premises that the Christmas tree
was a purely secular symbol, 345 that Chanukah was a secular holiday
symbolized by the menorah, 346 and that the government may promote
pluralism by sponsoring public displays having strong religious as-
sociations, 347 Brennan concluded:
To lump the ritual objects and holidays of religions together with-
out regard to their attitudes toward such inclusiveness, or to decide
which religions should be excluded because of the possibility of
offense, is not a benign or beneficent celebration of pluralism: it is
instead an interference in religious matters precluded by the Estab-
lishment Clause.3 48
III. Brennan's Jurisprudence and Catholicism
Although a devout Catholic, 349 Justice Brennan was a strict sepa-
rationist who became stricter still in maintaining a high wall of separa-
tion between church and state during his later years on the Court. In
addition to striking down prayer and Bible reading in public schools,
Brennan publicly opposed virtually every governmental program that
benefited church-related institutions and students.350
At first glance, it would appear that Catholicism did not affect
Justice Brennan's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Yet, one key as-
pect of the Catholic faith is the recognition of the dignity of the
human individual. According to the United States Catholic Confer-
341. See id. (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
342. See id. at 617-19.
343. See id. at 623, 627-32 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
344. See id. at 644 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
345. See id. at 640-41 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
346. See id. at 643-44 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
347. See id. at 644 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
348. Id. at 645 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
349. See EISLER, supra note 8, at 182.
350. See, e.g., Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397-98 (1985).
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ence ("USCC"), the staff arm of the National Conference of Catholic
Bishops, which presents the "official" Catholic view on political issues
in the United States:
Catholic social teaching is based on and inseparable from our un-
derstanding of human life and human dignity. Every human being
is created in the image of God and redeemed by Jesus Christ, and
therefore is invaluable and worthy of respect as a member of the
human family. Every person, from the moment of conception to
natural death, has inherent dignity and a right to life consistent
with that dignity. Human dignity comes from God, not from any
human quality or accomplishment. 351
Justice Brennan's underlying principles, to a significant extent,
parallel this view, though without the sectarian overtones. While these
principles might be more directly evident in death penalty352 and so-
cial welfare3 53 cases, they also apply to those religious minorities,
agnostics, and nonbelievers protected under the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment.
However, Justice Brennan's specific views on the relationship be-
tween religion and the law were contrary to those espoused by the
Catholic Church .3 4 The differences in opinion were most apparent in
the context of school prayer and public aid to private and religious
schools. His views led one major Catholic journal of opinion to com-
ment that Brennan was "not Catholic enough. Did he not vote against
aid to parochial schools? Did he not write a concurring opinion that
barred prayer from public school?" 355
During his tenure on the Supreme Court, Justice Brennan and
the Catholic Church differed in their opinions on the role of religion
in the public school classroom. The Catholic Church traditionally is
not opposed to religion in school, either in the form of prayer or in
education.3 56 On the contrary, the Catholic Church sought, and con-
tinues to seek, an extensive relationship between public schools and
351. Monsignor Dennis M. Schurr, General Secretary, NCBB/USCC, Sharing Catholic
Social Teaching: Challenges and Directions, http://www.nccbuscc.org/sdwp/projects/social
teaching/socialteaching.htm (last modified Oct. 20, 1999).
352. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
Brennan stated that "[t]he basic concept underlying the [Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause] is nothing less than the dignity of man." Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
99 (1958)).
353. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
354. SeeJoseph R. Preville, Leo Pfeffer and the American Church-State Debate: A Confrontation
with Catholicism, 33J. CHURCH & ST. 37 (1991).
355. Editorial, Justice Brennan and Successor, AMERICA, Aug. 4, 1999, at 51.
356. See Interview with William F. Davis, supra note 16.
Spring 20011 JUSTICE BRENNAN
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
religion.357 One key aspect of this is the belief that "[t] rue quality edu-
cation must address the moral and spiritual needs of the students."358
According to the USCC, this means "the development and implemen-
tation of a form of moral education integrated into the total public
school curriculum that responds to student needs and is respectful of
the variety of beliefs found in our nation."359 According to the Catho-
lic Church, public schools could accomplish these goals by imple-
menting school prayer, neutral religious education, and "released
time" programs. 360
Justice Brennan, however, disagreed with any notion of prayer,
religious education, or spiritual training as part of the public school
curriculum.3 6 1 In Schempp, Brennan, in his concurring opinion, noted:
It is implicit in the history and character of American public educa-
tion that the public schools serve a uniquely public function: the
training of American citizens in an atmosphere free of parochial,
divisive, or separatist influences of any sort-an atmosphere in
which children may assimilate a heritage common to all American
groups and religions.362
Incorporation of religion into secular public schools, Brennan further
noted, would undermine the value of either alternative.3 63
Finally, Brennan's opinions differed with those of the Catholic
Church in that he rejected the notion that religion in school would
automatically enhance the educational experience. 364 Instead, Bren-
nan argued that parents, and not government, should determine
whether the inclusion of religion would diminish or enhance their
child's education. 365
Brennan and the Catholic Church particularly differed on the is-
sue of public financing of parochial schools. The Catholic Church of-
ficially maintains that the government should provide "equitable tax
357. See Principles for Education Reform in the United States, http://www. nccbuscc.org/
education/parentassn/reform.htm (last modified Nov. 9, 1999).
358. Id.
359. The Role of the Catholic Church in Public Policy, http://www.nccbuscc.org/educa-
tion/fedasst/background.htm (last modified Nov. 9, 1999).
360. See Interview with William F. Davis, supra note 16.
361. See, e.g., Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
362. Id. at 241-42 (Brennan, J., concurring).
363. See id. (Brennan,J., concurring) ("The choice which is thus preserved is between a
public secular education with its uniquely democratic values, and some form of private or
sectarian education, which offers values of its own.").
364. See id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
365. See id. at 242 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("It is no proper function of the state or
local government to influence or restrict [the] election [of religion in education].").
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support for the education of pupils in public, private, and religious
schools to implement the natural right of parental freedom of choice
in the education of their children."3 66 Moreover, the Catholic Church
argues in support of "the principle that private and religious school
students and professional staff have the right and opportunity for eq-
uitable participation in all government programs to improve educa-
tion, especially those which address the needs of the educationally,
economically, and socially disadvantaged. 3 67 Thus, the Catholic
Church advocates an entanglement of public money with religious
schools to provide for basic educational services and any other pro-
grams necessary to support such institutions.3 68
Brennan disagreed with this position profoundly. Indeed, his dis-
agreement did not simply extend to remedial programs for disadvan-
taged students or federal funding for the teaching of disadvantaged
students in religious schools. 369 Rather, he opposed virtually every
governmental program that benefited church-related institutions and
their students, including salary supplements to parochial school teach-
ers, textbooks, instructional materials and equipment, testing and
scoring, diagnostic services, therapeutic services, and field trip trans-
portation programs. 370
Justice Brennan and the Catholic Church shared certain underly-
ing core values relating to human dignity. In this respect, Catholicism
did influence Brennan's decisions on the Supreme Court. However,
in Establishment Clause disputes, both parties have consistently held
opposite positions. While Brennan favored the Lemon test and a strict
separationist approach, the Catholic Church favored, and still favors,
an approach where government accommodates and helps finance re-
ligious education. 371
If Catholicism did not directly affect Brennan's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, then what did? Other explanations certainly ex-
ist. Arguably, Brennan's strict separationist view stems from his strong
notion of libertarian dignity, which focuses on the rights of the indi-
vidual. For example, in Marsh v. Chambers,372 Brennan argued that the
Establishment Clause reflected a "turbulent history" and that religion
should remain a personal and private matter "for the individual, the
366. The Role of the Catholic Church in Public Policy, supra note 359.
367. Id.
368. See generally id.
369. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 255-56 (1977).
370. See discussion supra Part II.
371. See The Role of the Catholic Church in Public Policy, supra note 359.
372. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
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family, and the institutions of private choice."373 This view is also con-
sistent with his argument against school prayer in Schempp174
Another possible explanation is that Brennan, in adopting a strict
separationist approach, sought to promote a sense of responsive de-
mocracy. According to Frank Michelman, responsive democracy "ties
the possibility of individual self government in politics to a society's
strict adherence to the precept of absolutely unrestricted access to
public discourse for every person and every view. '375 This view, a
"foundational substantive social norm," holds that an "uncompromis-
ing obedience to the principle of unrestricted public discourse is a
prerequisite for legitimate government."376 Michelman contends that
this may be closer to Brennan's constitutional view because it fits with
the notion of individual dignity. 377
One final explanation may be found in the speeches of the Jus-
tice himself. In 1985, at Georgetown University, Brennan spoke of a
living constitution. 3 78 According to Brennan, "the genius of the Con-
stitution rests not in any static meaning it might have had in a world
that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great principles to
cope with current problems and current needs. '379 Brennan's strict
separation approach to Establishment Clause cases, therefore, recog-
nizes the religious plurality existing in society.
Conclusion
Did WilliamJ. Brennan,Jr. keep his promise to the Senate Judici-
ary Committee to base his decisions on the Constitution, laws, and
precedent rather than on his personal religious beliefs in church-state
disputes? The answer seems to be a categorical "yes." Indeed, Bren-
nan's views on the proper relationship between religion and the law
were often directly contrary to the positions taken by his church.
Nonetheless, Brennan's Establishment Clause legacy protects not
only Catholicism, but religion as a whole. Whether the underlying ra-
tionale was ultimately Catholic virtue, libertarian dignity, responsive
democracy, or a tribute to the times, Justice Brennan's contributions
373. Id. at 802 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
625 (1971)).
374. See supra text accompanying notes 362-65.
375. FRANK I. MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY 42 (1999).
376. Id. at 43.
377. See id.
378. See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., Address, Construing the Constitution, in 19 U.C.
DAVIs L. REV. 2, 7 (1985).
379. Id.
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to Establishment Clause jurisprudence represents a concern for keep-
ing government out of religion. Indeed, Brennan's Establishment
Clause legacy, while currently challenged by members of the Court, is
part of what makes Justice Brennan one of the most important justices
in the history of the United States Supreme Court.
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